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CASES NOTED
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - CORPORATIONS - POWER OF
SEC TO PROHIBIT SOLICITATION OF FUNDS BY
STOCKHOLDERS' PROTECTIVE COMMITTEES
Petitioner and others, as a protective committee previously authorized
by the SEC to represent certain stockholders in reorganization proceedings
before the Commission, applied for permission to solicit all stockholders for
a voluntary contribution of five cents per share to help defray committee
expenses and attorneys' fees. Held, on a petition requesting review of the
SEC's order denying them this permission, that the SEC in refusing to allow
such solicitation was acting reasonably under powers granted it by the
Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935. Halsted v. SEC, 182 F.2d 660
(D.C. Cir. 1950).
Abuses, by stockholders' protective committees in reorganization pro-
ceedings, of the fiduciary relationship2 existing between them and the
corporations' security holders were notorious and widespread prior to the
enactment of the Public Utility Holding Co. Act of 1935.s The powers
granted the SEC under that act 4 reflected Congressional recognition of the
urgent need for responsible control over the expenses, fees and authority
requested by and granted to such committees 5 and their legal counsel."
As the responsible controlling agency for achieving the desired result, the
SEC has, in determining allowable fees and expenses to protective com-
mittees, undertaken to follow the standards set up in Chapter X of the
National Bankruptcy Act? Generally, these arc that the right to such
i. 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 791(e). 79k(f) (1946). Section 791(e)
(Section 12(e) of the Public Utility Holding Co. Act) grants the SEC the power to
regulate solicitations of "any proxy, power of attorney, consent or authorization regarding
any security of a registered holding company." § 79k(f) (§ 11(5) of the Public Utility
Holding Co. Act) allows SEC to require that all fees and expenses in connection with
reorganization proceedings "to whomsoever paid" be subject to its approval.
2. 52 STAT. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 649 (1946); See Woods v. City Nat. Bank
& Trust Co. of Chicago, 312 U.S. 262, 269 (1941); It re Mountain States Power Co.
of Chicago, 118 F.2d 405, 408 (3d Cir. 1941).
3. SEC, Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel
and Functions of Protective and Reorganization Comntittees, pt. I, 652; pt. II, 351-352,
356, 647 (1927); In re Paramount-Publix Corp., 85 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1936).
4. See note 1 supra.
5. SEC, Report on Protective Committees, pt. 1, 905 (1937).
6. Id. pt. I at 213, "In its avarice for reorganization fees the legal profession by
and large has forsaken the tradition of officers of the court and has become highly
entrepreneurial in nature; . . . members of the reorganization bar have not been re-
luctant to occupy inconsistent positions, and, under guise of disinterested service to the
estate, to act as faithful servants of interests hostile to the investors."
7. 52 STAT. 840 (1938), It U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1946); York Ry., 12 S.E.C. 348
(1942); United Tel. & Elec. Co., 7 S.E.C. 809 (1940).
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allowances is based on the benefits conferred by the activities of the com-
mittee on the reorganized corporation, s the burden of proof of such bene-
fits being on the claimants.9 The usual procedure of the SEC is to wait un-
til the services in question are substantially completed and can be evaluated
in light of the results they have achieved before granting allowances for
expenses and fees."'
It is apparent that both the courts and the SEC look upon the solici-
tation of funds as camouflage for a device either intended to defeat or
capable of defeating a basic need in reorganization proceedings-the effective
control of reorganization fees and expenses.' The decisions have favored
the view that the SEC may and should take into account the more subtle
factors affecting security holders in such situations.' 2 Where a literal inter-
pretation of a statute might result, as here, in a substantial variance from
legislative intent, the courts follow the legislative intent.' 3 While Section
11(e) of the Public Utility Holding Co. Act14 does not specifically cover
the solicitation of funds, strict confinement of SEC's control power over
solicitation to that relating to authority might invalidate the power granted
it to regulate fees and expenses.' A rigid construction of this section of
the Public Utility Holding Co. Act would sharply curtail SEC's power to
correct the aforementioned abuses' 6 and frustrate the intention of Congress17
in passing the pertinent legislation.
Ostensibly, SEC's refusal in the instant case was based on (a) pos-
sible retention by the committee of amounts from the solicited funds in
8. 52 STAT. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 649 (1946); Dickinson Industrial Site v.
Cowan, 309 U.S. 382, 389 (1940), . . .fee claimants are either officers of the court
or fiduciaries, such as members of committees, whose claims for allowance from the
estate are based only on services rendered to and benefit received by the estate."; In re
Mt. Forest Fur Farms of America, 157 F.2d 640 (6th Cir. 1946) (claims not allowed for
services primarily beneficial to stockholders; In re Standard Gas & Ele6. Co., 106
F.2d 215 (3d Cir. 1939); In re Mayfair Building Corp., 97 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1938);
In re Tower Building Corp., 88 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1937); In re Star Elec. Motor
Co., 67 F. Supp. 58 (D. N.J. 1946); Watters v, Hamilton Gas Co., 29 F. Supp. 436
(D. W.Va. 1949); United Tel. & Elee. Co., 7 S.E.C. 809 (1940).
9. See Woods v. City Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, supra note 2 at 268.
10. York Ry., supra note 7; Community Power & Light Co., 11 S.E.C. 817 (1942);
Great Lakes Utilities Co., 11 S.E.C. 1134 (1942); Federal Water Service Corp., 10
S.E.C. 200 (1941); Utilities Power & Light Corp., 4 S.E.C. 914 (1939) (request for
interim allowances payable out of estate of debtor dismissed as premature); but cf. Mid-
land Utilities Co., 4 S.E.C. 598 (1939) (request for interim allowance approved subject
to conditions).
11. Cf. Leiman v. Guttman, 336 U.S. 1, 8 (1948); Brown v. Gerdes, 321 U.S.
178, 181 (1944); Dickinson Industrial Site v. Cowan, supra note 8 at 388; Callaghan
v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 297 U.S. 464, 469 (1936); see note 5 supra.
12. See SEC v, Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 92 (1943); Morgan, Stanley & Co.
v. SEC, 126 F.2d 325, 331 (2d Cir. 1942).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542-544 (1940);
Foster v. United States, 303 U.S. 118, 120 (1938); Lincoln v. Ricketts, 297 U.S. 373,
376 (1936); North Am. Utility Securities Corp. v. Posen, 176 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir.
19494. 49 STAT. 838 (1935 15 U.S.C. § 791(e) 1946); see note 1 supra.
15. 49 STAT. 838 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79k () (1946); see note I supra.
16. See note 2 suta.
17. See note 11 supra.
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excess of those subsequently allowed and (b) possible difficulties in the
equitable return of such excess amounts to the proper persons.' 8 These
objections seem to lack substance in view of the minute nature of the
amount to be solicited. The decision reflects the basic reluctance of the
courts to substitute their judgment for that of specialized administrative
bodies'9 or to interfere with the exercise of reasonable administrative dis-
cretion.20  It provides support for the well-established doctrine that the
SEC's interpretation of its enabling legislation should control unless plainly
erroneous.2 ' Thus, it tends to establish the theory that the SEC is required
merely to conform with the statutory policy of Congress in exercising the
authority granted it by the Public Utility Holding Co. Act rather than
being required to set tip arbitrary standards to be applied inflexibly to all
situations.2
Representation in reorganization proceedings is, therefore, apparently
dependent upon the ability of stockholders to provide support for their
representatives pending the. granting of allowance for expenses. The fact
that the type of solicitation desired in the instant case was not permitted
might indicate that the SEC's methods do not accomplish the equality of
protection of all stockholders contemplated by Congress in enacting the
Public Utility Holding Co. Act. The wealthy stockholder can protect
his interests without difficulty, but for the stockholder whose shares repre-
ent his life's savings the holding in this case offers no protection.
INTERNATIONAL LAW-EFFECTIVENESS OF ADMINISTRATIVE
ACT OF UNRECOGNIZED FOREIGN GOVERNMENT
Plaintiffs, the Communist management of a Chinese banking corpora-
tion, sought to recover its deposits in an American bank. After motion for
summary judgment by plaintiff's attorneys, a second group of attorneys,
representing the ousted Nationalist management of the Chinese bank and
claiming to be the only attorneys empowered to represent that bank, filed
18. Halsted v. SEC, 182 F.2d 660, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
19. See Pittsburgh Plate Glass v. NLR.B, 313 U.S. 146, 161, 165 (1941); NLRB
v. flel.-N.J. Ferry Co., 128 F.2d 130, 136 (3d Cir. 1942); Campbell v. Devinney,
81 F. Supp. 657, 659 (D. D.C. 1939).
20. See, e.g., American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 118 (1946);
Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co., 81 F.2d 986, 991 (4th Cir. 1936); Kaunle v.
Haynes, 64 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Cal. 1946); Midwest Farmers v. United States, 64 F.
Supp. 91, 101 (D. Minn. 1945); Frahn v. TVA, 41 F. Supp. 83, 85 (N.D. Ala. 1941);
Application of Texas Co., 27 F. Supp. 847, 850 (E.D. Ill. 1939).
21. In SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 208 (1947), Mr. Justice Murphy
speaking of the Public Utility Holding Co. Act. of 1935 said, "The very breadth of the
statutory language precludes a reversal of the Commission's judgment save where it has
plainly abused its discretion in these matters"; see SEC v. Associated Gas & Flec. Co..
99 F.2d 795, 798 (2d Cir. 1938); North Am. Utility Securities Corp. v. Posen, 82 F.
Supp, 16, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd, 176 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1949).
22. See American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, supra note 20, at 104; SEC v. Chenery
Corp., supra note 21, at 207.
